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The aim of this paper is to analyze the degree of female wage discrimination in the Spanish region of 
Galicia relative to the rest of Spain. The analysis starts from an established fact: women’s average 
earnings are lower than men’s. First, we try to show the causes behind this wage differential. Next, we 
discuss the evolution of the wage gap between 1995 and 2002, in order to bring some light on the factors 
potentially accounting for wage discrimination persistence in Galicia and in Spain. We will analyze the 
distribution of the degree of discrimination using the Discrimination Curve and Discrimination Indexes 
proposed by Del Río et al. (2003). These indicators have the advantage of being decomposable, allowing 
a more exhaustive rendering of the factors characterizing wage discrimination, as well as the 
quantification of the incidence of discrimination for different social groups. Thus we can determine, not 
only if the degree of discrimination has had a similar evolution in both regions, but also if discrimination 
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  11. Introduction. 
 
Women’s incorporation to active population and to employment is a feature of labour 
markets in developed countries for the last 50 years. Nevertheless, although the 
presence of women is extended to all economic sectors and all occupations, empirical 
research about women’s position in labour markets shows important differences relative 
to that of men. Spain is not an exception to this general rule. 
Spain is a country constituted by 17 different regions, one of which is the north-western 
one called Galicia. Some economic characteristics of this particular region are that it has 
only 74.9% of average European Union (EU) GDP, and female unemployment rate 
doubles the male one. In 1995, an average woman’s wage in Galicia was 80.80% of an 
average man’s wage (i.e., the so-called “wage gap” was 19.20%). This fact is common 
to all European countries, only with differences in its magnitude. In this particular point, 
Galicia seemed to be in a privileged position, far from countries like Ireland and Great 
Britain where wage differences between men and women were higher (amounting to 
wage gaps of 34.3 and 35.2 percentage points, respectively), and closer to Belgium or 
Denmark (Gannon et al. 2004 and Simón 2004). In fact in 1995, Galicia was the 
Spanish region with the smallest gender wage gap, far away from the Spanish average 
showing a wage gap of 31.64%. However, the evolution of this gap was negative in the 
following years. With 2002 data, Galician women’s average wage was 77.77% of men’s 
wage. 
There is a general consensus regarding gender discrimination in labour markets both in 
Galicia and in the rest of Spain. All the usual indicators measuring workers’ situation 
are negative for women: they have a smaller presence in labour market, they suffer 
higher unemployment rates, they are over-represented in fixed term jobs, they are 
excluded totally or partly from some type of occupations (those of greater 
responsibility) and they receive lower wages. Our work is focused on this last particular 
aspect.  
Gender wage gap may be explained by different arguments, supporting significantly 
different interpretations. In neoclassical economic literature, wage discrimination is 
defined as the part of the wage gap which cannot be explained by "objective" 
differences, like levels of education, industrial sector, type of occupation, etc. Instead, 
non-neoclassical researchers take wage inequalities as a reflection of different types of 
female discrimination in labour market that cannot be independently measured. 
  2It is usual in the neoclassical approach to do a decomposition exercise of the wage 
differentials, trying to estimate which part is explained by women’s different position in 
the labour market, the remaining being taken as “pure discrimination”. Lower female 
wages could be justified because women as a group show smaller experience levels,  
work in lower-wage sectors (textile, manufacturing of wearing apparel, hotels and 
restaurants, trade), occupy smaller responsibility jobs within companies, have a lower 
tenure, etc. But these differences only explain approximately 50% of the total 
differential and therefore, simple and pure wage discrimination would continue being of 
the sort of 10- 15%. 
The alternative approach departs from a different consideration of discrimination. This 
is not limited to different wages for the same job, but to locate men and women in 
different labour spaces. First, women suffer from greater unemployment 
(unemployment rates twice as large as men’s rates). Moreover, the lower wages paid in 
some sectors would depend more on the female predominance in their workforce than 
on a strict productivity basis. In general, low wages sectors have a predominantly 
female workforce (Fernandez et al. 2004). Women’s lower presence in senior 
occupations, or  upper professional levels, is explained more by a persistent limitation 
of women promotion by men than women’s will. In fact, women are over-represented in 
groups of high educational levels and nevertheless they reach high responsibility 
positions in a much smaller proportion
1. The greater female presence in fixed term jobs 
(consequently, with a shorter tenure) and in part-time jobs shows an overall situation of 
discrimination with respect to men
2. 
In this paper we will focus on wage discrimination analysis following the first or 
neoclassical approach. That is, we are going to concentrate in pure wage discrimination, 
but this should not be interpreted as a dismissal of the importance of other dimensions 
of gender discrimination. 
In technical terms, wage discrimination exists when the gender wage gap cannot be 
attributed to differences in productivity
3. The aims of this paper are to analyse if gender 
wage discrimination exists in the Galician labour market, to measure it if the answer to 
                                                 
1 This fact can explain wage inequalities persistence in the public sector, occupied most of women with 
superior education. 
2 Although most of part-time jobs are female, the Encuesta de Población Activa (Labour Force Survey) 
shows that in Spain this is not a result determined by women's own choice, but due to the characteristics 
of the occupation or to not being able to find a full time job. 
3 We must take into consideration that productivity is not directly observable by the researcher. 
Consequently, we are forced to estimate the level of productivity from a set of observable characteristics. 
Selection of the characteristics to be included in this set is transcendental for the analysis of   
discrimination, since the omission of significant ones would lead to a biased result overvaluating 
discrimination. 
  3the first question is affirmative, to determine the magnitude of gender wage 
discrimination in Galicia relative to the rest of Spain, and finally to describe how this 
relative magnitude has evolved through time.  
There are few studies presenting comparative analysis about the regional distribution of 
gender wage discrimination in Spain. Aláez and Ullibarri (2000) located Galicia as one 
of the Spanish regions with higher percentage of gender wage gap due to 
discrimination, only exceeded by Murcia. This points to the importance of a deeper 
analysis of the Galician situation relative to the rest of Spain. Recently, Gradín, Arévalo 
and Otero (2003) produced a detailed analysis of income distribution with a significant 
focus on wage discrimination. Nevertheless this study deals only with Galician 1995 
data and does not include any comparative analysis.  
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 describes the usual methodology 
for measuring the degree of wage discrimination. Section 3 describes the data source. In 
Section 4 we decompose the gender wage gap, following the traditional Oaxaca 
(1973)decomposition, in order to compare the degree of wage discrimination in Galicia 
relative to the rest of Spain. In Section 5, we incorporate the distributive dimension to 
wage discrimination analysis, taking in consideration new indicators like the 
Discrimination Curve and the Discrimination Indexes proposed in Del Río, Gradín and 
Cantó (2004). These indicators have the advantage of being decomposable, which allow 
us to calculate the degree of discrimination for different social groups. Section 6 offers 





One of the techniques most used in order to estimate the degree of gender wage 
discrimination is Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) decomposition. This technique 
consists of decomposing the wage gap in two elements; one reflects the part of the wage 
differential due to differences in characteristics between men and women, and other the 
part of the wage differential which isn’t explained by differences in characteristics, also 
called “discrimination”. Many authors have applied this method for different periods 
and regions of the Spanish economy, and every paper confirm the existence of an 
important degree of wage discrimination. Among them we may refer to Ugidos (1997a), 
De la Rica and Ugidos (1995), Hernández (1995), and Pérez and Hidalgo (2000). Other 
authors focused their attention on specific Spanish regions, like Aláez and Ullibarri 
  4(1999) for Basque Country or Gradín, Arevalo and Otero (2003) for Galicia. Even 
Aláez and Ullibarri (2000) have done a comparison between all the Spanish regions. 
Nevertheless, this method presents some disadvantages. Its results differ according to 
the payment scheme used as non discriminatory reference, and also according to the 
composition of the set of characteristics included to estimate productivity. 
Consequently, the studies mentioned in the previous paragraph offered different values 
for the estimated degree of discrimination depending on their choice of reference 
payment scheme and set of characteristics. While this problem is well-known in the 
literature, none of the usual techniques employed can avoid it. 
Another problem, this time one specific of this method, is that it takes into account only 
the “average” man and the “average” woman for the estimation of the degree of 
discrimination. This is equivalent to assume that the discrimination is distributed 
homogenously, so discarding an important amount of information. 
Recently, new methods have been developed in order to improve the wage gap 
decomposition by taking into account information about wage distribution. One of them 
was proposed by Juhn-Murphy-Pierce (1991), and then used by authors like Blau and 
Khan (1996, 1997) or Simón (2004). This technique maintains the component of 
Oaxaca’s decomposition which captures the wage differential due to the differences in 
characteristics (productivity). The difference with Oaxaca’s decomposition is in the 
other component (called discrimination). In this case, that measure of discrimination is 
divided in two, one part reflects the wage differential attributable to their mean 
percentile ranks (interpreted as the level of unobserved ability) and the second one 
captures the wage differential due to the wage dispersion (interpreted as abilities prices 
or individual characteristics prices), which in this case we could interpret as 
“discrimination”. 
Nevertheless, this method is not free from problems. First, the interpretation of one of 
its components as an indicator of the level of unobserved abilities is bold. This value 
could be due as much to unobserved characteristics as to the simple explanatory 
variables omission. Second, as we are making reference to gender discrimination, this 
component could be reflecting the unobservable part of discrimination itself. Moreover, 
as Suen (1997) demonstrates this decomposition gives biased results as long as the 
position in the distribution is not independent of its standard deviation.  
Another technique -recently developed and enjoying high rates of acceptance- that try 
not to focus only on average values is that of quantilic regressions. This method allows 
to estimate the degree of discrimination in different points of the distribution. Authors 
  5like Gardeazabal and Ugidos (2003) or Dolado and Llorens (2004), have estimated the 
degree of discrimination at different quantiles for the Spanish economy in order to see 
how it evolves throughout the distribution.  
Several authors have pointed to the necessity of paying attention to the distribution of 
the degree of discrimination. Jenkins (1994), starting from the poverty and inequality 
literature, did an application of the Generalized Lorenz Inverse for the estimation of 
discrimination. In the same line, Del Río, Gradín and Cantó (2004) built a 
Discrimination Curve. This curve reflects the discrimination per capita accumulated for 
the total of discriminated women. Discrimination curves are graphic tools which can 
show us what it is happening in an economy at a first glance. Nevertheless, they can be 
of little use in comparative analysis, because if they cross they cannot be compared. For 
this reason, in order to sum up all the information a Discrimination Curve provides in a 
single comparable value, Del Río, Gradín and Cantó (2004) presented discrimination 
indexes adapting the poverty indexes of Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984). These 
indexes show very desirable properties like continuity, dominion, symmetry, invariance 
in population replications, weak monotonocity and the weak principle of transferences. 
Moreover, these indexes also have other important characteristic for the objectives of 
our paper, i.e. decomposability. This property allows to compute the indexes for 
subpopulations, allowing the estimation of degrees of discrimination for socioeconomic 
groups. Note, however, that this property makes the indexes subject to the critique 
exposed by Sen (1976), who indicated that the poverty of a particular group 
(discrimination in our case) may not be independent of that of another different group.  
 
3. Data.  
 
The source used in this paper is the Encuesta de Estructura Salarial (EES, Wage 
Structure Survey), elaborated by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE, National 
Statistics Institute) for the years 1995 and 2002. It is a survey with a large number of 
observations, although it does not represent the whole employed population. Actually, 
the reference population is formed by employees
4
 working in establishments with ten or 
more workers, involved in any economic activity except agriculture, farming, fishing, 
Public Administration, Defence, Social Security, private households and extra-territorial 
organizations and bodies. The 1995 EES does not include the following activity groups: 
                                                 
4 CEO, Board members, and all other personnel whose earnings consist mainly in fees or profits instead 
of wages are excluded. 
  6M (education), N (health and social work) and O (other community, social and personal 
service activities). All these groups have been excluded from the analysis to maintain 
homogeneity between both periods used in this work. 
The use of this survey for the analysis of wage discrimination presents two main 
disadvantages. The first one is the lack of data about significant variables potentially 
important to explain the gender wage differential, like working experience or marital 
status. However, the inclusion of marital status as a determinant of wage differentials is 
not widely accepted. Regarding working experience, we have calculated a proxy 
variable through age and education. The second disadvantage of the EES consists in 
being limited to private sector wage-earners employed by medium and large size 
companies, and so excluding agriculture, fishing, and several services sectors. The 
potential influence of these characteristics on the degree of wage discrimination is 
unclear. Not including public sector employees could overestimate the degree of the 
wage discrimination
5. Nevertheless, the lack of small-firm data and the inclusion of 
some private services sectors where discrimination can be higher than the average, 
could work in the opposite direction, undervaluing the estimation of the degree of wage 
discrimination
6. Both facts can be very important in the Galician economy, where 30% 
of the wage-earners are employed in sectors not covered by the Survey. The incidence 
by sex of the excluded group is also quite diverse (22% of male wage-earning workers 
and 41% of female ones). 
These disadvantages are somewhat countered by the advantage of working with a 
sample of the dimensions of the EES, which includes a wealth of information about 
wage-earners and the establishments where they are employed. This richness of 
information allows us to analyse the wage-determination process both from the demand 
as well as from the supply side of the labour market. 
The degree of gender wage discrimination has been estimated from the computation of a 
“normal” hourly wage, obtained as the monthly earnings divided by the number of 
hours worked (normal and extraordinary) in the reference month (October). This month 
does not feature payments nor periods of absence of a seasonal character (payments due 
beyond the month or holyday periods), making it possible to obtain "normal” or 
“ordinary" monthly earnings, minimizing the incidences in questionnaire answers due to 
the beginning or conclusion of labour activity during this month. The resulting hourly 
                                                 
5 Negative differential treatment in women’s wages appears to be concentrated in the private sector 
(Ugidos 1997 and García et. al. 1998). 
6 Many female earners work in small companies in trade and services sectors where average wages are 
lower. 
  7wage is lower than what would be obtained if annual data were used, because in that 
case extraordinary prizes and payments that are made in random periods or with 
regularity superior to the month would be added. The reason for using this method is 
that the estimation of the hours worked in the reference month is more precise than that 
of annual hours worked. Nevertheless, this choice can lead to undervaluation of the 
degree of gender wage discrimination, since it obviates the potential discrimination due 
to higher extra payments to male workers, not linked to their productivity. Finally, to 
allow for comparisons between workers, the monthly earnings of those who did not get 
a complete monthly wage due to unrewarded absences has been adjusted considering 




4. Estimation of aggregate discrimination through 
Oaxaca’s decomposition. 
 
Next we offer an estimation of the degree of aggregate discrimination in Galicia and the 
rest of Spain for 1995 and 2002, through Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) 
decomposition. This method is based on Becker (1957). According to him, in the 
absence of discrimination the ratio of wages between two groups (in this case men and 
women) must be equal to the ratio of their respective productivities. In order to calculate 
productivities, we estimate two ordinary Mincer wage equations by OLS, one for each 
sex: 
i u β ˆ Z lnw i i + ′ =  
where wi is the individual hourly wage, Z′i is an individual characteristics vector, β is 
the estimated coefficients vector and, ui is the error term. 
The degree of discrimination has been calculated assuming men’s prices as the non-
discriminatory wage structure, i.e. in absence of discrimination male and female 
characteristics would be paid at men's prices. Although this non-discriminatory wage 
structure is the most usual, some authors have proposed other alternatives. For example, 
Oaxaca (1973) also proposed to use as non-discriminatory prices women’s payments. In 
this case we would obtain a measure of nepotism, which is favouritism towards men, 
with men receiving payments over their productivity. Neumark (1988) proposed a non-
                                                 
7 The aim of these adjustments is to estimate the normal degree of discrimination, i.e. what we could call 
“base discrimination” as different from discrimination caused by other factors, like prizes which have a 
more discretionary character. Moreover, several filters have been applied (worker’s age lower than years 
of tenure in the company, negative wages...) to eliminate atypical observations. 
  8discriminatory structure intermediate between female and male prices. Thus, the 
unexplained part of the wage differentials would be divided in two, one representing 
discrimination and the other nepotism. 
The measure of gender wage discrimination using men’s prices as non discriminatory 
would be obtained from the following expression: 
m m h h m h m h Z Z Z w w ′ − + ′ − ′ = − ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ) ( ln ln β β β  
where the upper bar indicates the mean of the variable and subscripts h and m represent 
man and woman respectively. In this equation, the differential of average wages is 
obtained as the sum of one part that is explained by the vector of characteristics
8 (first 
term), plus another that it is not, and it is interpreted as explained by discrimination 
(second term). 
Table 1 shows the results obtained for Galicia and the rest of Spain in 1995 and 2002. In 
1995, the Galician gender wage gap was near to 20%. But, in absence of discrimination, 
this gap would be reduced to 6.42% (the degree of discrimination was 10.25%). In 
2002, the Galician gender wage gap reached 23%. This increase is explained partly by a 
rise in the part of the wage differential due to differences in characteristics, but mainly 
by a considerable increase in the degree of discrimination (in 2002 it reached 14.01%). 
The rest of Spain showed a higher gender wage gap than Galicia in 1995, arriving at 
25%. This was explained both by higher gender differences in characteristics (10.69%) 
as well as a higher degree of discrimination (13.60%). But between 1995 and 2002 the 
situation remained quite stable , resulting in the approximation of the Galician degree of 
discrimination to that already existing in the rest of Spain.  
 
Table 1: Discrimination though Oaxaca’s decomposition  
 W m/ Wh 
% wage gap due to 
characteristics. 
% wage gap due to 
discrimination 
Wm/ Wh (in 
absence of 
discrimination) 
Wage gap due to 
differences in 
characteristics. Discrimination 
Galicia 1995  83,32%  38,52%  61,48% 93,58%  6,42%  10,25% 
Galicia 2002   77,92%  36,51%  63,49% 91,94%  8,06%  14,01% 
Spain 1995  75,71%  44,01%  55,99% 89,31%  10,69%  13,60% 
Spain 2002 75 82% 39,17%  60 83% 90 53% 9 47% 14 71%
                                                 
8 We have included variables related to individual worker's characteristics (potential experience, tenure, 
or level of studies reached), as well as variables related to job characterization (occupation, type of 
contract, working time status, firm size, agreement type, and activity sector). 
  95. Analysis of the distribution of the degree of wage 
discrimination. 
 
The calculation of individual discrimination offers the possibility of analysing the 
degree of discrimination for all points in the wage distribution and for different 
socioeconomic groups. In order to obtain a measure of individual discrimination we 
must calculate for each woman i the difference between the estimated wage if their 
characteristics are paid to the male medium prices ( mi r
∧
) and the estimate wage if their 
characteristics are paid to the female medium prices ( mi y
∧
 )
9. Instead of using absolute 
values, we calculate for each woman her degree of discrimination relative to her 

















This individual information about the degree of discrimination allows to calculate a 
Discrimination Curve. This curve shows the degree of discrimination per capita 
accumulated for the total of discriminated women in decreasing order from the most 








1 ) ; (  
Being:   vector of individual wage discrimination, n total number of 
employees and k some number so that 
{ 0 , max ) ( mi m i v v g = }
n k ≤ . We can define  n k q / * =
10 as women 
percentage who suffers discrimination. Moreover, the degree of convexity of the curve 
would show how discrimination is distributed.  
Table 2 displays the discrimination curves. The two graphs in the higher part of the 
table  combine the discrimination curves for Galicia and the rest of Spain, the one on the 
left for 1995 data and the other one for 2002 data. These graphs represent the evolution 
of the degree of discrimination both in Galicia and in the rest of Spain. On the other 
hand, the two graphs in the lower part combine the curves for both years, the left one 
                                                 
9 Both wages are obtained according to the following expressions:   and 
 
) exp( m mi mi Z y
∧ ∧
= β
) exp( h mi mi Z r
∧ ∧
= β
10 being k* the number of discriminated women 
  10corresponding to Galicia and the other one to the rest of Spain. Looking first at the 
Galician curves, we can see an upward shift from 1995 to 2002, clearly representing an 
increase in the degree of discrimination. Furthermore, the percentage of discriminated 
women has risen from 86% in 1995 to 97% in 2002. In the case of the rest of Spain, on 
the contrary, the curves for 1995 and 2002 are very similar, and so are the percentages 
of discriminated women. 
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  11In order to sum up all information provided by discrimination curves in a single 




















v dr ,  1 > α  
Where α would be a coefficient of “aversion to discrimination” and k* the number of 
discriminated women. In this paper we will use α = 2 in order not to give too much 
weight to discriminated women. 
Table 3 presents the values of discrimination indexes in Galicia and in the rest of Spain, 
both in 1995 and in 2002. It is clear that the degree of discrimination in Galicia has 
increased strongly, getting much closer to the value corresponding to the rest of Spain. 
 
 
Table 3: Discrimination indexes 
(α=2) 
Galicia 1995  Galicia 2002 Spain 1995 Spain 2002
0.0190 0.0264  0.0246  0.0272 
 
 
Now, we will use the decomposability property in order to analyse the degree of 
discrimination for different socioeconomic groups. First, we take a look at the values 
corresponding to deciles of income. In Galicia, from 1995 to 2002, the increase in the 
degree of discrimination was more pronounced for the higher income sections. As in 
1995 the degree of discrimination was higher in medium-lower income sections, this 
means that the degree of discrimination became more homogeneous throughout deciles. 
In the rest of Spain the discrimination increased for the higher income sections and 
decreased for the lower ones. As the 1995 was fairly homogeneous, this means that the 
degree of discrimination became slightly increasing with levels of income throughout 
deciles. Graph 1 shows the degree of discrimination in Galicia relative to the rest of 
Spain for deciles of income. As we can see the degree of discrimination in Galicia 
increased towards the values present in the rest of Spain for all deciles, even surpassing 




  12 
 
Gráfico 1: Level of discrimination in Galicia relative to the 






















Next, we take a look at distribution according to educational levels. In 1995 the 
distribution of the Galician degree of discrimination was similar to that of the rest of 
Spain. Discrimination was concentrated in the lower and higher educational levels 
(remember, although, that the overall level of discrimination in Galicia was lower). This 
polarization was much reduced in 2002 for the rest the Spain, because the increase in 
the degree of discrimination took place at medium levels of education. The opposite 
happened in Galicia, where the increase in the degree of discrimination between 1995 
and 2002 was more intense for the lower and higher levels of education. Graph 2 
illustrates these trends. The graph shows Galician degree of discrimination levels 
catching up those of the rest of Spain except in the group of FP
11 medium. Another 
feature of this graph calling for attention is the relatively high degree of discrimination  







Graph 2 : Level of discrimination in Galica relative to the rest 





















                                                 
11 This Spanish education level is an alternative to bachelor (FP medium degree) or graduate (FP superior 
degree) studies. 
  13Table 4 displays the degree of discrimination for type of occupation. In 1995, the 
occupations with a higher value of the discrimination index in Galicia were craft works, 
jointly with managers and operators. Minimum values corresponded to service workers, 
instead. Looking at the results for 2002, we can detect qualitative and quantitative 
changes, with managers and professionals showing the strongest increase in the degree 
of discrimination. These results agree with the results obtained for educational levels, 
because employees with a higher level of studies (usually professionals and managers) 
show the highest degree of discrimination.  
While in 1995 Galicia showed lower values for the degree of discrimination than the 
rest of Spain in all occupations except for managers, in 2002 not only managers, but 
professionals, services, craft work and garbage collectors (services) presented higher 
values of discrimination indexes in Galicia than in the rest of Spain. 
As we mentioned in the Introduction, wage discrimination is not the only kind of 
significant discrimination in labour markets. Occupational discrimination is usually 
regarded as, at least, of equal importance. The existing literature points to the existence 
of a stabilising effect when both kinds of discrimination are considered together. It 
seems that those occupations where there is a higher percentage of women show a lower 
average hourly wage. Is there, then, a relationship linking occupational discrimination 
and wage discrimination? The results we obtained show an important correlation 
between the degree of discrimination and the percentage of women occupied in Galicia 
(the coefficient of correlation is -0.61  in 1995 and -0.47  in 2002), while for the rest of 
Spain the results are even stronger. However, in both cases, this correlation has 
decreased significantly from 1995 to 2002. 
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Table 4: Discrimination indexes for occupation 
Galicia Spain 
   1995  2002  1995  2002 
  
Discrimination 
Indexes  % women 
Discrimination 
Indexes  % women
Discrimination 
Indexes  % women 
Discrimination 
Indexes  % women
Legislators, senior  
Officials and Managers  0.048  7.69% 0.0797  11.17%  0.0345 7.22% 0.0232  14.36% 
Professionals  0.0111 22.66% 0.0743 26.97% 0.0187 18.29% 0.0304 26.80% 
Technicians and 
 Associate Professionals  0.0178  15.59% 0.0250 28.96% 0.0237 21.15% 0.0377 33.84% 
Clerks  0.0131 45.55% 0.0244 58.25% 0.0192 49.07% 0.0264 55.00% 
Service Workers and Shop 
 and Market sales workers  0.0086 37.66% 0.0227 55.14% 0.0157 37.73% 0.0194 52.91% 
Craft and related 
 trade Workers   0.0327  16.37%  0.0374 8.30% 0.0378 9.71% 0.0369 8.46% 
Plant and Machine  
operators and assemblers 0.0215 19.29% 0.0280 23.09% 0.0317 15.32% 0.0355 17.33% 
Garbage Collectors  
(service workers)  0.0126  68.22%  0.0184 73.33% 0.0201 57.46% 0.0164 75.99% 
Garbage Collectors 
 (other activities)  0.0205  13.83%  0.0094 22.87% 0.0412 18.26% 0.0211 23.50% 
Coefficient of correlation  -0.61 -0.47 -0.69 -0.62 
 
Finally, Table 5 displays the values of discrimination indexes for activity branches. The 
results show again the same pattern: a clear increase of discrimination indexes in 
Galicia. Nevertheless, these results must be taken with caution because in some cases 
significance problems exist. 
Just as in the previous case we could analyse if some relation between the percentage of 
women for activity branch and the degree of discrimination exists. The data in Table 5 
shows a correlation coefficient near to zero between these two variables, both for 
Galicia and the rest of Spain
12. The logical interpretation is that these two kinds of 










                                                 
12 Except for Spain in 2002 
  15Table 5: Discrimination indexes for activities branches 
Galicia Spain 
    1995 2002 1995 2002 
  
Discrimination 
Indexes %  women
Discrimination 
Indexes %  women
Discrimination 
Indexes %  women 
Discrimination 
Indexes %  women
Manufacture of food 
 products and beverages  0.0607 49.48% 0.0548 52.69% 0.0435 27.77% 0.0433 34.42% 
Manufacture of textiles   0.0034 83.67% 0.0157 89.82% 0.0445 57.33% 0.0431 60.22% 
Manufacture of leather 
 and leather products   0.0114  34.29%        0.0047  33.38%  0.0111  38.57% 
Manufacture of wood  
and wood products  0.0222 6.97% 0.0049  13.79%  0.0095  11.91%  0.0153  15.15% 
Manufacture of pulp,  
paper and paper products   0.0095 28.44% 0.0413 33.95% 0.0339  20.2%  0.033  27.02% 
Manufacture of chemicals,  
chemical products and  
man-made fibres   0.0211 23.32% 0.0627  34.4%  0.0147 24.82% 0.0326 29.09% 
Manufacture of rubber  
and plastic products   0.0097 20.66% 0.0289 24.59% 0.0208 16.73% 0.0341 22.85% 
Manufacture of other 
non-metallic mineral 
 products   0.0017 4.4%  0.047 8.33% 0.022 9.83%  0.0375  11.66% 
Manufacture of basic metals   0.0115 3.41% 0.0223 8.92% 0.0221 8.93% 0.0304  10.53% 
Manufacture of fabricated  
metal products, 
except machinery  
and equipment   0.0166 8.43% 0.0384  10.04%  0.0142  10.92%  0.0272  12.68% 
Manufacture of electrical  
machinery and 
 apparatus n,e,c,   0.0044 7.11% 0.0441 8.33% 0.0126  21.79%  0.0228  23.67% 
Manufacture of motor  
vehicles, trailers 
 and semitrailers  0.0006 6.12%  0.034 11.18%  0.0144  11.49%  0.0273  17.75% 
Electricity, gas, steam 
 and hot water supply  0.074 8.67%  0.0075  6.14%  0.0378  10.91%  0.0452  15.45% 
Construction   0.0004 2.52% 0.0308 4.66% 0.0303 6.34% 0.0493 6.88% 
Sale, maintenance and  
repair of motor vehicles 
 and motorcycles; retail  
sale of automotive fuel   0.0166 38.54% 0.0244 49.25% 0.0363 38.06% 0.0302 47.28% 
Hotels and restaurants   0.0127 44.09% 0.0134 59.42%  0.011  43.2%  0.0083 55.48% 
Land transport; 
 transport via pipelines  0.0055  12.94%  0.0198 14.7% 0.0182 19.9% 0.0382 23.47% 
Financial intermediation,  
except insurance  
and pension funding   0.0066 18.92% 0.0065 26.22% 0.0051 24.92% 0.0189 35.69% 
Rent activities  0.0091 35.73% 0.0262 55.04% 0.0206 34.12%  0.022  53.32% 




  16 
6. Conclusions. 
 
Since the restoration of democracy in Spain in 1975, important advances in the 
recognition of women social and labour rights have taken place. Nevertheless, the 
situation of the female Galician worker at the beginning of the 21st century is far from 
the equality levels that the laws recognize. In this work we have analysed one of the 
main identifiers of this lack of equality of opportunities: the existence of discriminatory 
criteria in the valuation of female work.  
The analysis started from a stylised fact: women’s average gain is inferior to men’s one. 
Therefore, our immediate goal was to find the causes of this differential, analysing the 
possible existence of wage discrimination against women in Galician with respect to the 
rest of the Spain (used as reference). Moreover, the utilization of discrimination indexes 
allowed us to calculate the degree of discrimination for different social groups, as well 
as in the aggregate. And the data availability for two different years, 1995 and 2002, 
defined our second objective: to compare the evolution of discrimination in Galicia with 
that in the rest of Spain, trying to shed some light on which factors can affect wage 
discrimination persistence in Galicia. 
The results obtained show that in Galicia between 1995 and 2002 the degree of gender 
wage discrimination has increased significantly, affecting mainly those women that are 
more educated, have better jobs and are present in the higher income deciles. These are 
similar to Dolado and Llorens (2004) findings. 
The evolution in the rest of Spain, instead, was qualitatively and quantitatively different. 
The degree of gender wage discrimination increased only slightly, affecting mainly the 
groups with higher income, medium educational level, and high-medium occupational 
level. The combination of these differences in evolution with the differences present at 
the starting point in 1995 tended on the whole to make the picture of gender wage 
discrimination in Galicia much more similar to its counterpart in the rest of Spain. 
Although in our calculations we are not analysing the whole of the Galician economy -
neither the small firms, nor the agrarian sector, nor some sector services activities, nor 
the public sector are considered- these results are troubling. In fact, they show that for a 
big part of the Galician economy discrimination has increased. This happened in a 
context where a host of public agencies are carrying out policies intended to facilitate  
the incorporation of women to the labour market and to make effective the equality of  
opportunities between men and women. But what still could be worse news is that the 
  17discrimination has increased more in the groups of women with highest education levels 
and those who hold jobs with greater responsibilities. This supposes a clear disincentive 
for women and is a signal of serious inefficiencies in the labour market. 
The strong change detected in the degree of discrimination in Galicia relative to the 
higher stability showed by data regarding the rest of Spain is a surprising result, difficult 
to explain. For this reason, we will have to continue our research on this topic, using 
other data sources and extending the comparisons to individual Spanish regions, with 
the aim of finding out if the results we have reported in this paper are robust.
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